Introduction
THE attention reccntly given to the problem of urban surplus labour in developing countries has been occasioned in part by the disappointing performance with regard to employment generation of the industrialization strategies followed by many developing countries over the last decade. Despite significant investment, the rate of growth of industrial employment has frequently lagged behind not only industrial output growth but also population growth (Morawetz, 1974) . The recognition that, unlike unemployment in the industrialized countries, the labour market imbalance is not predominantly a consequence of cyclical downiturns in economic activity, but is chronic in niature and unsusceptible to rtemand augmenting remedial policies, has also stimulated interest. Indeed, there is evidence (Barnum and Sabot, 1977) to support the uncolnventional conitention (Todaro, 1969 ) that demand and supply in the urban labour market interact such that an increase in the former leads to an increase in the magnitude and perhaps even the rate of unemployment, as a consequence of an increase in mnigration from rural areas.
The concern with urban labour market imbalance is not a response to firm evidence that the magnitude of the problem is large and growing. Labour market surveys are scarce in developing countries, but more fundamentally, despite considerable analysis of what is meant by surplus labour in rural areas (Kao, Anschel, Eicher, 1964) , little bas been done to clarify the concept in the context of urban labour marl<ets. The measure of labour market imbalance devised in the industrial couiitries and entailing the division of the total population into three distinct and mutually exclusive categories, those not in the labour force, the employed, and the unemployed does not capture the full extent of the problem because in developing countries employment cannot be treated as a discrete homogeneous category. Assertions that the problem of urban surplus labour is grave are frequenitly substantiated by reference to the inumuber of workers engaged in marginal, low-income activities, an indication of which is the gap between 'modern sector' wage employment and urban population, However, in at least some segments of urban 'informal sectors' the observed I Thanks are due to P. Collier, A. Hazlewood, D. Jackson, E. P. Jackson, H. Leibenstein, P. Streeten, and to partioipants in seminars at Harvard and Oxford for helpful oomments on an earlier draft of this paper. Financinl support from the Development Centre of the OECD, the IBRD, and the Rookefeller Foundation are gratefully acknowledged.
relatively low capital/labour ratios may be due to different relative. factor prices than in the 'formal sector' rather than a reflection of the absorption of excess supplies of labour.' More generally simply dlocuiniiieitingr the proportion of workers with incomes below a certain poverty level as is also done in most measures of 'invisible underemployment', 2 is Ain t 'i mneasure of labour market imbalance as it leaves uinanswered the funldzaemital question of the nature of the relationship between the income criterion applie(d and the excess supply of urban labour.
The aim of this paper is to clarify the definitioni of urban stirplius labour and to measure its magnitude, in one context, that of Ta[za 1 jia, with greater precision than has previously been possible. This entails der ving an income criterion from the intersectoral misallocation model of unemploymenit that imbues underemploymnent, or, to distinguish the concept suggested here from the conventional ones, employed surplus labour, with the same normative implications with regard to labour allocat;oii as open unemployment. Employment and unemployment statistics are stibject to two types of error: inaccuracies in a measure given its (Icfiflitioni anld di%,errences between two or more measures, often relatd(l for purposes of economllic analysis, but based on differing definitions. The empirieni analysis of imbalance between supply and demand in Tanzania's urban labour inarkett required the design and admniistration. of a sample survey to serve as a. new source of data. Though this survey is less (letaile(l than we, mihllt have desired, it is an improvement on the existing sources, which suffer from a high degree of error, not in the precise statistical senise that can be expressed numerically as the standard error in comparing various si ni pIes of the same population, but in the more general sense of imnperfection and inicompleteness in description. 3 The survey allows us, in Se(ction I, to (determine the sensitivity to alternative specificationis of the hlazy borderlinies between labour force participants and non-participants, and bet w ecui. the employed and the non-employed, of our measure of the aggregate rate of open urban unemployment. It also alows us, in Section If, to examine the principal feattures of labour utitilization in the own-account sc otor as a way of assessing the chort-cut method, in which the l)proportionI of ownl-aceoulntl 1 The (listinction between the modern and informal sectors is in l HnlFr rathler oiidnligii,ils.
The recent ILO mission to Kenya defines the 'modern sector' as iwelhidi:ig all workers enumerated in government surveys of establishments. Tho 'iiCiwrimil seetor' hieludes all other employed workers. See ILO (1 972).
s See ILO (1966) . 8 The National Urban Mobility )'inploynmont and Income Siur,vey of Tanzania (NYUMEIST) gatheredl data from 5,500 randomlly selected aduilt respondents in seven urban areas in Tanzania on their demographic mobility, eu rre it oniploymnent, einplornment }history, and income characteristics. For (letails on sample selectioni, quiestionnaire design, reliabilityv of the data, and other methodological questions, see Sabot (1977) . workers in the Xrbl)ai laltbour force is used as a proxy, of ineasuring employed surplus labour. 1 Following a brief critique of several other conventional measures of underemployment in Section II, we extend the sectoral misallocation model in Section III by adding a third sector, urban in location and characterized by an absence of barri: .;,o entry and flexible wan,ges. It is shown that, as long as empnh)o yerwit anid waiting in the uteue. :for high-wvage jobs are not mutually exelusive activities, some of the excess stLI)ply of urban labour will eniter this sector anld accept an income below what could be carned in the rural areas. Tlhese workers are the employed surplus labour, not in the conventional sense that their removal from the urban sector would not re(Itce urbanoutput, but in the nmore limiiited sense thattheirtransfer to the rural sector would inierease national ouitpuit. The rate of emiployed surplus labour is estimated for urban Tanzania and the sensitivity of the estimate to alternative specifications of the rural income criterion is determined.
I. Open unemployment
.rhe unemployed, those involuntarily without paid employment, are generally identifie(d with reference to some positive actioni which theyv themselves have taken during agivenperiod, such as going to agovern minerit emliloymiienit office, waiting in a job quieue at a factory gato, or writinig a letter to a potenitial employer. Table I reveals that -when this laboLur force participationi criterion of active job search is applied, the aggregate rate of open unemployment is only 8 per cent of the 'labour force'. The rate varies, however, with alternative concepts of labour force participation and employment. Consider first the amount of 'hidden unemployment' reveale(d by a change to a passive job search criterion amn then the amounlt of 'hidden employment' that results from using mark;eted production as a criterion. for identifying economic activity.
When there are only frictional levels of uniemployment in the labour market, the direct costs of seeking a job do not influence the decision wiether or not to do so. Hfowver-er, with a significant level of urban surplus lal)our and downwardly inflexible wages, the cost of job search is hkely to be introduced as a comp)oneit of the labour supply function. For some urban residenits, though. the wage of those in e-i-iployinenit will exceed the reserve price of their Ia i.oiur, the expecte(I net retuirins to active job search, the wage minus the expected costs of job search (the latter increasing with the level of suirplius labour), will be less than their reserve price. This implies that more pople tire willing to work at the going wage than are enwtae(l in active job search. To adjust for the discouraged worker phenomenon and the consequent 'hidden unemployment' row 2 of Table I presents estimates of the rate of .pc= -unemploymentbasedon a 'passive job search' criterionl-an individual is considered a labour force participant if he (or she) incicated in the survey that he was looking for paid employment whether or not he had engaged in active job search within the reference period.1 The expression of the intention to work is a better indicator than active job search for willingness to work at the going wage both because the former reflects the response to the cost of job search while the latter dces not and because in African labour markets the job search process does not necessarily involve the formal channels noted above. Individuals frequently sectire jobs on the basis of information from members of family or friends who are cemployed. Relaxing the job search criterion increases the aggregate urban unellmployment rate in Tanzania by one-half to a total rate of 12 per cenit. 1 An alternative approach to measuring hidden unomployment is to estimate a labour force participation function and to use the cooficient on the unemployment variable to estimate the size of the labour force under oonditions of full employment. The difference between the full employment labour force and that mcnsurrod on the basis of the active job-search criterion constitutes hidden unemployment.
The unemployment estimates in rows 1 and 2 are based on the assumption that all adults other than those who earn a cash income either are not in the labour force or are unemployed. Production for the market is thus the criterion for distinguishing between economic and hon-economic activity for those not earning a wage. That a peasant who supported his family without participating in the cash market would be viewed as not contributing to national income and outside the labour force illustrates the arbitrariness of this criterion. Though production for home consumption or barter is far less important in towns than in rural areas, 2 per cent of all adult urban males and 14 per cent of women grow crops to feed their families, or produce non-agricultural goods that never reach the market (Sabot, 1977a) . Earners of low money incomes are counted among the employed and there is no apparent reason why producers of goods for home consumption or barter should be treated differently. Therefore in Table I, 
II.
Rejection of an identity between employed surplus labour and the self-employed If we view employment as a continuous rather thani as a discrete and homogeneous variable, many urban jobs in developing countries can be seen to be closer to the unemployinent than to the full employment end of the continuum. Before we can assess the amount of urban surplus labour in TanzaniaL we must determine the place of the dividing line between 'adequate' and marginial employment; or, viewed from the perspective of the labour force, the dividing line between employed workers who are 'surplus and those who are fully employed.
One way to do this is to use the gap between the rate of growth of wage employment and that of the urban labour force as an inidicator of the trend in the magnitude of urban market imbalance (Frank, 1968; Todaro, 1971) . Applying this method in a static framework requires the assumption that all own-account workers are sturplus labour and all wage earniers are nonsurplus. The applicationi of this imethod to Tanzania yields a total of 30 per Faor discussion of the determinants of unempiloyment rate differentials hetween men and women and among other population sub-groups, and their implications for the assessment of the resource and subjective costs of urban surplus labour, see Sabot (1977b) .
394 MEANING AND MEASUREMENT OF URBAN SURPLUS LABOURt cent of the urban labour force as surplus labour, 10 per cent as unemployed, and 20 per cent as employed surplus labour. The accuracy of this measure, however, depends on the realism of the rather heroic assumption of an identity between employed surplus labour and own-account workers. Reynolds has described the marginal jobs in which employed surplus labour is likely to be found:
Entrance to the occupations in question is open. Most of them require little or no skill, and also little or no capital. They thus provide a natural eiltry point for migrants from the country, who win a precarious foothold in. the urban economy by crowding into petty trade, services and o-her small-scale activities. Overmanning of these activities contributes to low output and income per worker (Reynol ds, 1 9 6W').
Thus we can assess the realism of this assumption by examining the activities, stability in employment, and incomes of own-account workers. If we judge scale by the amount of initial capital required, rather than by the value of output relative to large-scale establishments only st.reettrading appears to be uniformly small-scale among the service activities which employ 66 per cent of the total of own-accotint. workers. (See Table  II .) The transport sub-group contains owners of taxis and lorries, evei iiimen with several vehicles and hired drivers, as well as menial porters. Among shopkeepers though some have only a small stall, others have stores large enough to require the assistance of hired or family labour. Though luxury housing has been nationalized and most rentiers let only a room or two, there are some with several eight-room 'Swahili' dwvellings at their disposal. The hotel and bar category incudes owners of modern establishments in the centre of the city as well as workers who sell indigenous beer at a stand under a palm tree in the 'suburbs'. Like lack of capital, absence of the necessary skill can be a barrier to entry into an occupation, particularly in manufacturing, where tailors, cabinet makers, bakers, and brewers are in the majority, and in contracting, which incudes masons, roofers, carpenters, electricians, and plumbers. Among goods-producing activities, only cultivation appears to be uniformly small-scale; though land scarcity is likely to constrain entry to this activity. The importance of own-account work as a point of entry to the urban labour market is determined by an examination of the means of support, of current migrants during their first months in town.' Eighty-four r-r cent relied on one or more of the seven sources of funds listed in Table III , ranked according to the proportion of migrants drawing on each. Only 6 per cent of new arrivals supported themselves even partially through some form of self-employnmet. If we exclude those who found a wage job within a month after arrival and those who come to toNvn for other purposes such as education, the proportion of self-employed new arrivals is still only 11 per cent.
It is possible that new arrivals live off their savings or rely on aid from relatives because the probability of finding a high-wage job is greater for unemployed workers tlhaii for the self-employed. Once these sources of support are no longer available, migrants may turn to self-employment as a means of prolonging their period of job search, using own-account work as a short-term source of income. In this case we woul(l ex)pect th( greatest proportion of the current self-employed migrants to have arrived in town recently and to have been in tlleir current occupation for a sliort, time only. Table IV shows that only 6 per cent of all non-wage earmers iad(1 arrived in town within six months of the enumeration; an additional 8 per cent had been in town for six to eighteen months, Sixty per cent of all migrant own-account workers and no less than 50 per cenlt of each activity's participants had lived in town for over five and a half years. Similarly, Table V The expectation that the income of self-employed workers in urban areas will be uniformly low is based on the presumption that tne non-wage sector, by virtue of its opeiness, is subject to downward pressures exerted by an excess supply of labour, from which the income of woikers in the wage sector is protected. But we have showvn that the sector is not homogeneous in this respect; a significant proportion of the self-employed are engaged in activities with barriers to entry, self-employment is not primarily a means of access to the wage segment of the urban labour market, and only a small proportion of new entrants rely on self-employment while seeking a wage job. The diversity in the nature of activities and the stability of workers in the sector suggests that, contrary to conventional expectations, there is considerable variation in earnings from self-employment. Per cenit of income earners reveals that the degree of inequality in the distribution of income is unambiguously greater in the non-wage than in the wage sector.
III. Visible and invisible underemployment Visible underemployment, the number of employed persons working short hours because there is not enou gh work for them, is a conceptually sound component of surplus labour. In the urban wage sector it is estimated, however, that less than 5 per cent of the participants are visibly underemployed. Even among employees working less than 40 hours per week the proportion seeking additional work is equally low; most wage earners working short hours appear to be doing so voluntarily, perhaps because they are secondary earners with other non-oconomic commitments, or because they are primary earners who devote much of their time to other sources of income. Moreover, there is no evidence that visible underemployment contributes significantly to the explanation of low monthly wage incomes.
In tJhe non-wage sector, wvhere most low income urban workers are concentrated, the iia(gnitude of visible underemployment can be determined conceptually. By defirnitioni, visible inderemplfloymiieint is a wage sector phenomenon only. Since there is no demanid for labour per se in the owvnaccount sector, it cannot constrain the number of hours worked. 2 If ownaccount workers work short hours they do so voluntarily, either because the returin to an additional hour of work declines below the supply price of labour at a relatively low level of hours worked per week, or because time is devoted to job-search activities in the high-wage sector. In the former case, the worker has withdraw7n from the labour force; it is only in the latter instance that he could be conisidere(d uniiemji)loye(i for part of the work week. Since the worker is not looking for more of the same work but for a different job, presumably at a higher income, however, he cannot be considered visibly underemployed. The phenomenon appears to be of little significance empirically in Tanzania (Sabot, 1977b) .
The rate of invisible underemployment, the proportion of the labour force with an 'abnormally low' income despite long working hours is 1 Adijustirng for the impact of tc;..es, fringe benefits and for differonees in the distribution of income between Africans and Asians does Inot alter significantly this finding. See Sabot (1977b) .
I Joan Robinson (1936) uses a similar argument to support her contention that peasant farmers cannot experience visible undleremployment, as defined above. 'An economy consisting of sell'-suipport ing femilirs each worlking their own land must always enjoy full employment, since each irntdividual is free to work as long as he considers the real reward he obtains a sufficient inducement for his efforts.' Robinson's conucpL of full lamploynont is not -,xclusiva of the sort of disguised uneneployment central to the analysis of dual economy models of growth. Even in a situation where time is allocated optimally from the point of view of the individual, there may be 'disguised unemployment' in the sense that some individuals receive an income in excess of the marginal product of their labour as a consequence of income-sharing arrangements within the household.
generally measured by applying a 'poverty datum line' (PDL) as an income criterion. Though different assumptions on prices, size of family, proportion of income actually spent on the goods and services deemed essential, and the degree of access to transfer payments contribute to significant variance in estimates made for the same place at the same time, the greatest problem with PDL estimates is tne arbitrariness and subjectivity of judgements of minimum needs. Using the ho ely urban minimum wage, originally established on the basis of a PDL, the estimated level of invisible underemployment varies from 22 per cent, assuming a 55-hour standard work week, to 41 per cent assuming a 40-hour standard, for all urban income recipients. 1 It is difficult, however, to interpret these estimates except in strictly descriptive terms. While the subjective costs of employed surplus labour, the loss of satisfaction which would have been derived from the output forgone as a consequence of leaving part of the labour force underutilized, may be of greater concern than its resource costs, it does not follow that it is possible to assess the magnitude of employed surplus labour by identifying workers with inadequate income. This woiild be to confuse the problem of poverty, a function of technology and productivity, of the distribution of wealth and earnings, as well as, perhaps, underemployment, with that of labour market imbalance. As Sen emphasizes 'to identify unemployment with poverty seems to impoverish both notions since they relate to two somewhat different categories of thought'.2
IV. An allocative efficienicy criterion for the measurement of urban surplus labour Between 1948 and 1971 the population of the seven towns included in the Tanzania survey increased nearly four-fold. The average annual growth rate of 6 per cent is more than twice the rate of growth of the rural population over the same period. 3 It is estimated that natural growth accounted for a little more than one-fourth of the urban increase. The contribution of migration to urban growth is also revealed in an examination of the residential history of the population of the seven towns. In 1971 fully 83 per cent of all adults were born somewhere other than their current town of residence. In this study an urban resident is classified as a migrant only if he came to town after the age of 13. Even when this narrower definition is applied, approximately two-thirds of the total adult population of the seven towns is comprised of migrants (Sabot, 1977a) .
Since the level of rural-urban migration is a key determinant of the aggregate supply of urban labour, it follows that the problem of surplus labour must be closely linked with the migration process. Recent theoretical work has suggested that migration proceeds in response to differences between rural incomes and urban expected earnings, defined as the product of the urban wage and the probability of finding an urban job, with urban unemployment acting as an equilibrating factor on such migration (Todaro, 1969) . In an econometric study, designed primarily to test the hypothesis that, in conditions of open unemployment and inflexible urban wag.eres, rural residents take account of employment probabilities as well as income differentials in estimating the returns to migration, the power of a human capital investment model to explain differentials in rates of migration among regional, urban, demographic, and educational sub-groups of the rural population was significantly increased by the addition of the ratio of employment growth in a four-month period to unemployment as an independent variable (Barnum and Sabot, 1977) . The results of the study lend confirmation to the hypothesis in question and to its corollary that for some rural residents the move to town is income ma ximizing behaviour even though the probability of finiding a high-wage job is less than 1.
In the theoretical work on the relationship between migration and urban labour market imbalance the existence of a low-income sector where incomes are flexible is either ignored, or it is assumed that the uniemployed and self-employed can be aggregated without loss of precision in the analysis, an assumption which in the case of Tanzania we have slhown to he empirically unfounded. A closer look at the role of the flexible income sector in the urban labour market yields the income criterion we are seeking for measuring employed surplus labour. The distribution of the national labour force among three sectors and its implications for the :returns to labour in each sector, for the maximization of national output and for the definition of urban surplus labour, can be illustrated by means of Figs. 2  and 3 ,
The situation of 'regular wage employment' in the urban areas is depicted in Fig. 2(a) . This sector is characterized by a mechanism of wage-determination wihich is not competitive. That is to say the interaction of supply and denar, l alone is insufficient to result in a wage that will 'clear the market'. The supply curve of labour to the urban regular emiplopiienlt sector is labelled S; the supply of labour at higher wages is assumed to be mostly the consequence of migration from the rural sector. As in the Todaro model if a wage is established above the laissez-faire equilibrium le-vel, urban jobs are 'rationed' among competing applicants bya sort of queucinig nleceianisin iniplyinig that potential migrants must weigh the costs of waiting in the queue for urban jobs against the benefits of eventually receiving a higher income. This means that at wvages above wo there is only a probability, not a certainty, of finding a job; and this is in contrast to the situation below wo. Thus, at w 0 the supply curve of labour becomes less elastic causing the curve to be kinked at its intersection with the demand curve. If the demand curve for labour remains fixed, the supply curve of labour is given by S. However, if the demand curve for labour shifts upwards to the right the labour supply curve will be as the dashed line S' (a straightforward continuation of the supply curve below wo).
The seconid urban sector, comtiprised of income earners who do not receive a wage and of wage earners hired and paid on a daily basis, is (lepicted in Fig. 2(b) . 1 Fig. 2(c) illustrates the rural se stor, which we take as mainly colnsisting of small-scale agriculture. It is assumed that both the ownaccount and casual employment urban sector and also the rural sector are distin,guished from the urban regular employment sector by the absence of institutional or other constraints on competitive income determination. 2 Consider an initial situation in wvhich the wage in regular urban employment, wo, is set at the level which clears the market so that all of the Lo workers who offer themselves for employment are employed. Then given flexible wages in the other sectors wo = r o yo, and since income equals the marginal product of labour in this situation there is no possibility of obtaining any additioni to total output simply by altering the (lisposition of the total labour force among the three. Sc(toi-s. Now coisidei an inerease in the wage in urban regular employment as a coli3eqlIculee of tlle introduction of minimum wage or other labour legislation, of pressure from trade unions, or of tile action of employers for whom increases in tie wage-rate induce proportionately greater increases in labour productivity (Jackson, 1972; Knight, 1967, and Sabot, 1977b) . The supply of labour in this sector increases to L 2 and the number of regular-employment jobs deelinc.s to L 1 . 3 The net result of the increase in the iv'age-ratc being ani-'excess' supply of labour in the urban sector of L 1 L 2 . 4 1 This sector is not synonymnLous with the 'informal sector' as defined by the ILO, as a significant proportion of casual workers are included in government surveys of establishments. However, if the formal--informal sector dichotomy is based on a difference in the wage determination meohanism such that wages are 'protected' from market pressures in the former and 'unprotectod' in the latter, then the flexible wage sector can be identified with the informal sector.
2 Activities carried on in rural areas where the legal iinimum wage applies, such as plantation agriculture and governmont employment, aro thus excludedl from tho analysis.
I As drawn the elasticity of curve A (the proportional change in labour outputl in the regular employment sector divided by the proportional change in marginal product) is less than unity. It has been shown (Corden and Findlay, 1975 ) that when the olnativity exceeds unity a rise in the, wage, while still leading to excess supply, will entail a backward sloping supply curve and thus a decrease in the number of workers in the urban soctor and( an increase in rural sector labour and output. 4 A rise in the urban real wage is likely to entail a change in the 'terms of trade' bIetween the regular-enploy,ment sector and the other two sectors in favour of the former. This should cause an inward shift of the marginal product curvo in the latter. These shifts may be somewvhat offset by increases in ou1tput demand resulting from the changes in the terms of trade and the increase in the urban population. The consequences of alterations The proportion of this excess supply that remains in open unemployment and the proportion that enters the own-account and casual employment sector depends on the degree to which employment in the latter sector places a constraint on job-search behaviour in the regular-employmentsector. At one extreme, participation in the own-account and casual sector is equivalent to participation in the rural sector in that employment entirely precludes effective seeking for urban jobs so that all of the excess supply remains in 'open unemployment'.' At the other extreme, participation in the own-account and casual-employment sector does not interfere at all with job search activity in the regular-employment sector and none of the excess supply of labour remains openly unemployed as the costs of waiting in the job queue can always be reduced by participation in the own-account and casual employment sector. The inerease in the number of workers in the sector, No N,, equal to the loss of employment in the regular sector plus the number of additional migrants, a total of L, L 2 , pushes down monthly incomes from ro to r,. Since the increase in the urban sector labour force, Lo-L 2 , which comes from the rural sector, raises incomes there only from Y 0 to Y, we obtain both a relatively high-incoine urban sector and a relatively low-income urban sector, wtith incomes in the rural sector falling in between. This configuration of wu, and L,, with r 1 and N 2 and Y, and Fl, is 'stable' in that it can persist over a long period: the positive probability of obtaining a high-wagee job retains the N, workers in the urbani own-account and casual-employment sector despite the low remuneration there and despite the higrher incomes obtainable in agriculture. It is economically quite 'rational' to work in this sactcr at an income below the rural opportunity cost of migration. 2 in prevailinr rtlati%e, prices and in the pattern of sectoral domanid interactions are peripheral to the main analysis and are ignored here. 1 In this case some of the Lo Lx labour attractedl by the high-wage employment opportunities is drawn from the own-account worrk and casual employment sector as well as from the rural sector.
I Furthermore, the levol of unemployment does not equilibrate the flow of urban migrants. An increase in rural out-migration decreases iincomes in the own-account and casualemployment seetor relative to rural sector incomes, thus increasing the cost of job search per period. 13y increasing the level of 'exe ss' urban supply, migration also (lecreases the probability of finding a high-wage job, and this increases the number of periods necessary to wait in the low-income urban sector before finding a job in the reg]iinr.einployinmit soctor. Therefore expected total costs of job search rise with the increase in migration. (This raises an addlitioinal complication regartling the determinants of t lie slope of S relative to S'. When partieipation in the owni-account andl easual-employment sector does not constrain, or oonl -poirt iill-const rni,i-4, a person's abili t t o look for a job in the sector of regular employment, the ad(litionial labour rlrlwhrnitig froTn the countryside is likely to be grenter than Lo L 2 and the total exceoss -;ii )plpp will be groate.r than L L.. This is because, on the assumption that the diistitility of work and job search are tlie samt, income from casual or own-account employment reduces the costs of job search per pe r iodl relative to the situation in wvhich a job seeker must be unempnployoel, thus increasing the exp)(ctodl not returns to migration for agivenrural-urban income differential andl imnplying an increase in the slope of S. In the case where employment places no constraint on job search, income in the It is unlikely that either of these extreme cases--where the ratio of the probabilities of obtaining a high-wage job for the employed or the unemployed is either zero or one-applies in the tirbaln areas of Tanzania. A significant proportion of the cm iploye(l are engaged in active job search, suggesting that employment and job searel are not entirely mutually exclusive activities, while the significant level of open unemployment is evidence that the perceived probability of finding a job is higher for the unemployed than for those in own-account or casual emiiploymielnt. In this case the excess supply of urban labour resulting from the high wage in the regular employment sector divides itself between openl unemiploynment and low-income employment in the own-account and casual-employment sector. ' In the situation that results from the increase in the urban wage it is clear that the urban unemployed Could be more l)rodtlctivly engaged in the agricultural sector; in addlition, as long as employmeiit (loes niot entirely preclude job search, there is a proportion of workers in the owvn-acc otiult and casual-employment sector whose transfer to the rural sector would inierease total output. The posi,ibility that such a change in the allocation of the labour force could lead to iMlerease(l over-all outpuit pIox'i(les both the rationale for calling the urban uinemiiployed 'surplus' andl also the basis of an income criterion for the measuremienmt of emiiployed surpllus labour.
To define cleaAly this inicome criterioin Fig. 3 clarifies the relationihilp between marginal product in the rural sector and the disposition of the national labour force, Ma "-inal product is measured on the vertical axis and the number of wowke_ _s measuired on the horizontal axis, but, in contrast to Fig. 2(c) , measurement is from riglht to left, from 0' and the rural marginal product of labour eur-e slopes(I onivai d l'Cfrom right to left. The total labour force, 00', is divided between the urban areais (lbotlh sectoris) anid the rural areas. When a given number of workers, e.g. O'N,, are employed in the rural sector, tlle marginal product in that sector can be read from the corresponding position on the vertical axis accorlilng to curve C.2 The marginal product curve of the own-account and casualown-account and casual income sector declines to a level somewhat below r 1 due to tlho addition of more workers while income in agriculture rises to a level somleowiat above. y 1 with the migration of more workers to the urban sector.) l How preocisely workers allocate themselves is (letermined by the ratio oftlle )rnolmiilit it' of obtaining a ligli -wage job for the employed and the iniient pl (.
It can be demonstratid rigorously that the closer the ratio is to 1, the less own-account or caiual employment constrains the ofteet iveoiness of job search, theln, for a givein rural-urban income differential. (a) the greater is the total excess supply fr'izti li,nig; (b) the greater is the proiportion of the total excess supply in own-accoint or casual empi) lo-n (nt ; (c) tlle olow Cer i.s tlim e,quililbriitin rate of unemiploiment.; (d) the lower is thli euilibrium income level in th1oe owi--n-eoonit nn(I casual-labour sector, and (e) the gret(r I lie gal) is betweernnrgiinal product in that sector and in the rural sector. See Sabot (1977a) for a formal explication. employment sector from Fig. 2(b) may be superimposed on the marginal product curve in the rural sector, making due allowance at the left-hand side of the diagram for the workers in urban regular employment (at wage w 1 ); that is to say the measurement of labour in the own-account and casual employment sector starts from Li not from 0. The L 1 N 1 workers in Fig. 3 equals the N 1 workers in Fig. 2(b) . 1 As drawn it is obvious from Fig . 3 that the transfer of N1 N 2 workers from the urban own-account and casual-employment sector to the rural sector would yield a net gain to total output equal to the shaded area. Urban surplus labour, N 2 N1, thus comprises workers whose marginal productivity is less than it would be in rural areas. That is to say, urban surpluw labour must be measured with respect to the marginal product of workers in agriculture. 2 the urban sector, e.g. ON, is taken then the marginal product in the rural sector can be read according to curve C. 1 Here we assume that own-account work or casual employment does not effeotively constrain job search, so that the own-account and casual-employment sector acts as a sponge soaking up tho excess supply of urban labour. 2 Only if the demand for labour in the r egular employment seotor is invariant with respect to the wage rate will N, N in Fig. 3 equal L 1 L, in Fig. 2(a) and XIN, in 2(b)-the total excess supply of labour. If the wage increase decreases the demand for labour then the number of workers whose transfer from the ownt-account and casuai-employment sector to the rural sector would increase total output is somewhat less than the total excess supply. This implies that the high urban wage imposes a cost on the economy not only by resulting in urban surplus labour as defined but also by leading to excessive capital intensity in
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Curve C' implies that with rural labour force O'N 2 there is disguised unemployment in the traditional sense that subject to qualifications regarding the indifference map between work and leisure (Berry and Soligo, 1968), labour can be withdrawn from the sector without any loss to output, marginal product = 0. From the above definition it is obvious th-at if curve C' applies then there is no unique problem of urban employed surplus labour. No matter how low the inicome in the own-account and casual employment sector, if the marginal product of labour is greater than zero, allocative efficiency is increased and there is a net gain to total output associated with the movement of rural labour into the sector.' In this situation the unemployed still constitute urban surplus labour, if transferring them to own-account or casual-employment would not reduce marginal productivity in that sector to zero.
The income criterion necessary for the measurement of emiployed surplus labour should now be clear. It is the marginal product prevailing in the rural sector with the existing disposition of the labour force. Due to diminishing marginal productivity, such a measure will yield an overestimate of employed surplus labour. It treats the B curve as being horizontal in the vicinity of N 1 , but, in Africa at least, this may not be too far removed from reality. An estimate of the magnitude of urban eplll)loyed surplus labour in Tanzania is presented in Table VII . The level of rural income per labour force member is the criterion applied to the (listriblhtioli of urban income. Rural inter-regional income differentials, which persist in Tanzania partly because of intra-rural constraints on labour mobility are a potential source of bias in the measuremenit of employed surplus labour. This is eliminated by grouping the migrant popiflatioi(i by region of origin. For each of the seventeen regional groups a separate 1inlC1omeI criterion is anplied to measure surplus labour. The axrc.rage of the regional criteria is used to measure the surplus only for non-migrants. Of the total urban labour force, 10-3 per cent is classified as employed surplus labour. As expected, given the differences in the distribution of income between wage earners and own-account workers the proportion of the latter group categorized as surplus labour is nearly four times that of the formiier. 2 Adding the 9 9 per cent of the urban labour force that is openly iuemployed production in the regular employment sector. Even if N 1 N2 is transferred to tho rural sector total output could be further increased by employing nalditiontil labour in the rgiulir employment seotor.
yields an estimate of 20 2 per cent as the total proportion of the urban labour force that is surplus. 1 
V. Conclusions
We have drawn on data from a national household survey-the design of which is more appropriate for the analysis of labour market phenomena in LDCs than conventional labour force surveys-to assess the magnitude ofthe excess supply of labourinTanzania's urban areas in 1971. Caleulating Total surplus labour 20-2 W Weighted average of the proportions of the .xrban stocks of migrants from each of seventeen regions earning less than average product in rural region of origin and the proportion of non-migrants earning less than average rural product.
SouRcE: NUMEIST, 1971. rates of unemployment under alternative labour force participation criteria and definitions of employment in order to adj ust for 'hidden unemployment' and for 'hidden employment', we arrived at a range of 8-12 per cent of the urban labour force, with 10 per cent as the best single estimate of the level of open umemployment. Assuming that some urban residents, given the prospect of eventually finding a high-wage job, will accept an urban income below what they could earn in the rural areas, the appropriate income criterion for the measurement of urban surplus labour is marginal product in the rural areas. Transferring this urban surplus labour-those earning less than rural marginal product-to the rural sector would increase total output. This criterion is preferable to coniventional income criteria, which proved lacking in analytic justification, and to criteria based on the 1 Variation among individuals in embodied human capital and hence in potential produetivity, and in dependency status and access to alternative sources of income and hence in the deprivation thoy will suffer through unemploy-nent or low-income omployment, implies that an index of resource or welfare costs would roquire the urban labour surplus to be assessed at a relatively high level of di.saggrogationi. This is beyond the scope of the eurrent paper: hence the term aggregate magnitude of urban surplus labour refers to the proportion of the labour force comprising the problem as defined.
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assumption of an identity between the self-employed and employed surplus labour which we have shown to be empirically unfounded. Although a rural income criterion yields a significantly lower estimate than do these other criteria, 10 per cent of the employed urban labour force is still estimated to be surplus.
Some qualifications are in order. If worlkers in the own-account and casual-employment sector do not differ in regard to dcegree of monopoly power they all receive an income equal to the productivity of the marginal worker and the rural marginal product criterion yields an overestimate as all of ON 1 in Fig. 2(b) or L 1 NA in Fig. 3 would be included as surplus. The dispersion of incomes among own-accountworkers indicates tlat differenices in skills, levels of complementary physical capital, desirability of business locations, market information, and so forth contribute to varying degrees of monopoly power among sector participants. Nevertheless to the extent that there are segments of the urban labour market wvhere workers have no monopoly power, one of which may be the market for casual labour, the estimate of employed surplus labour has an upward bias.
In addition, divergence between social and private marginal product can arise where there are income-sharing conventions in family enterprises or where distribution of custom among workers is random. If the group as a -whole, family or non-family, has a degree of monopoly power in the m-iarlet in which it is trading, and the average product of the group exceeds rural marginal product, then there will be an underestimate of the man(itulde of employed surplus labour. If the group as a whole exercises little monopoly power, thus having an average product close to the sector marginal product and less than rural marginal product, there may be an oveiestimate of employed surplus labour. Furthermore, as there are no measures of rural marginal product in Tanzania, average rural product is used as the inicome criterion contributing to an upward bias in the measure of employedl surpluls labour. However, the gap between average product and marginal procluct is likely to be narrow in rural Tanzania, given the low capital/labour ratio and plentiful availability of land. Also tho measure of employed surplus labour is not highly sensitive to small changes in the rural income criterioni applied: rural incomes 10 per cent and 20 per cent lower only reduce the estimated magnitude of employed surplus labour to 9 per cent and 7 5 per ceint respectively. Moreover, there is a strong prestumption tha't the cost of living is somewhat higher in town than in the countryside; nflj tist illg for the cost-of-living differentials would result in an increase, in thle estimate of employed surplus labour.
In conclusion, while better estirnates of ernployed surplus labour must await further improvements in the data base, the allocative efficiency approach to the measurement of urban surplus labour provides the basis
